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Tomaž Fleischman1 and Paolo Dini2
1Be Solutions d.o.o., Bleiweisova cesta 30, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: tomaz.fleischman@be-solutions.si
2London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
e-mail: p.dini@lse.ac.uk
October 2020
Abstract
The increasingly complex economic and financial environment in which
we live makes the management of liquidity in payment systems and the
economy in general a persistent challenge. New technologies are mak-
ing it possible to address this challenge through alternative solutions that
complement and strengthen existing payment systems. For example, the
interbank balancing method can also be applied to private payment sys-
tems, complementary currencies, and trade credit clearing systems to pro-
vide better liquidity and risk management. In this paper we introduce the
concept of a balanced payment system and demonstrate the effects of bal-
ancing on a small example. We show how to construct a balanced payment
subsystem that can be settled in full and, therefore, that can be removed
from the payment system to achieve liquidity-saving and payments grid-
lock resolution. We also briefly introduce a generalization of a payment
system and of the method to balance it in the form of a specific appli-
cation (Tetris Core Technologies), whose wider adoption could contribute
to the financial stability of and better management of liquidity and risk
for the whole economy.
1 Introduction
A payment system consists of two main parts, the obligation network and the
liquidity source/sink, which is used to facilitate the discharge of obligations in
the obligation network. A balanced payment system is a payment system in
which all obligations can be discharged simultaneously. This is possible when
the total inflow of cash equals the total outflow of cash for every part of the
system – meaning that the system satisfies the flow conservation condition, such
that the conclusion that this clears all obligations in the system is trivial.
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Constructing a balanced system has practical value. For example, subtract-
ing a balanced subsystem does not disrupt the balance of the remaining payment
system. This means that the subtraction of a balanced subsystem will decrease
the total debt in a payment system without disturbing the relative liquidity po-
sitions between the remaining counterparties with non-zero net positions. The
key to constructing a balanced system at any one time is a centralized knowl-
edge of the obligations that are present at that time between the members of the
obligation network. This centralised knowledge allows to maximise the amount
of mutual indebtedness that can be taken out of the obligation network. The
benefit of membership is liquidity-saving for the participating members and a
decreased systemic risk for the members and the wider economy.
An obligation network can be viewed as a set of payments due. Payments
reflect the complex and highly interconnected supply networks and form a dense
strongly-connected obligation network. ‘Strongly connected’ means that there
is a path of payments or invoices in each direction connecting any pair of firms.1
If the obligation network is not strongly connected then it can usually be split
into just a few strongly-connected parts or “clusters”. A consequence of this
definition is that all the firms in a strongly-connected network are part of at least
one cycle. Although this sounds encouraging, depending on the distribution of
liquidity over the payment system members we can observe situations where
payments cannot be processed individually. Leinonen [1] provides the following
definitions for different possible liquidity distributions:
• Circular - is a situation where individual payments can only be settled
in a specific order. This situation is resolvable by reordering the payment
queue.
• Gridlock - is a situation in which several payments cannot be settled
individually but can be settled simultaneously. This situation is resolvable
with multilateral off-set.
• Deadlock - is a situation where the individual payments can be made
only by adding liquidity to at least one of the system participants.
The methods used to resolve these situations are called Liquidity-Saving
Mechanisms (LSMs). The benefits of LSMs in interbank payment systems are
well described and demonstrated in [2] on a set of real data. An LSM applied
to a payment system shortens the queues and reduces the need for additional
liquidity to discharge the obligations.
The use of LSMs in interbank payment systems is widespread, but the ben-
efits of liquidity-saving do not reach everyone. In particular, small companies
with limited access to liquidity often use various alternative ways to discharge
their obligations on the trade credit market or through the use of complemen-
tary currencies. This brings up the question of systems interdependence and
risk of liquidity problems spilling from one system to another. Foote [3] shows
that the use of an LSM in one system reduces this risk in all systems.
1Such a path usually involves multiple, and different, firms in each direction.
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Similarly to a payment system, a balanced obligation network is a network
that can discharge all obligations simultaneously. The most important task of
any LSM is to find such a network. To manage the risks in the context of the
increasing complexity of payment systems, the concept of a balanced network
should be applied to as many payment and clearing systems as possible.
2 Notation and Definitions
We will use standard matrix and lattice algebra. The notation and basic defi-
nitions are based on work of Eisenberg and Noe [4]. We use boldface to denote
vector character and uppercase Latin letters for matrices and also for sets. G
is reserved to indicate a graph, and N = {1, 2, ..., n} ⊂ N. For any two vectors
x,y ∈ Rn, define the lattice operations
x+ := (max[x1, 0],max[x2, 0], · · · ,max[xn, 0])
x− := (−x)+ = (max[−x1, 0],max[−x2, 0], · · · ,max[−xn, 0]).
(1)
Let 1 represent an n-dimensional vector all of whose components equal 1, i.e.,
1 = (1, · · · , 1). Similarly, 0 represents an n-dimensional vector all of whose
components equal 0. Let ‖·‖ denote the l1-norm on n. That is,
‖x‖ :=
n∑
i=1
|xi| . (2)
We use the following terms:
• Obligation network - is a directed graph where the nodes2 represent
firms and the edges represent the obligations. Parallel edges are allowed
to represent multiple obligations between two firms.
• Nominal liabilities matrix - is a matrix representing total obligations
or liabilities between firms. We will define special vectors to describe
properties of the nominal liabilities matrix.
• Payment system - is constructed by adding special function nodes to
the obligation network. These special nodes represent sources of funds
and a store of value. They can have connections to all nodes in the obli-
gation network, and the set of all connections for each special node will
be described by a vector.
Let graph G represent the obligation network with n nodes representing
firms, m edges representing obligations between firms, and the function o(e)
representing the value of a single obligation e ∈ E between firm vi and firm vj
(e.g. from a single invoice). The graph G may contain multiple edges from node
vi to vj . We use (vi, vj) ⊂ E for the subset of E that corresponds to all the
2Usually referred to as vertices in graph theory.
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edges between node vi and node vj . These definitions are summarized formally
as follows:
G = (V,E, s, t, o) directed graph of obligations between firms (3)
V = {v1, · · · , vn} set of n nodes representing firms (4)
E = {e1, · · · , em} set of m edges representing individual obligations (5)
e ∈ E individual edge from set E (6)
s : E → V assigns the source node to each edge (7)
t : E → V assigns the target node to each edge (8)
o : E → R assigns the value of the obligation to each edge (9)
The nominal liability matrix L is a square (n × n) matrix each of whose
entries is the sum of the obligations between two firms. Since companies do not
invoice themselves L has zeros on the diagonal. Each entry is given by
Lij =
∑
e∈(vi,vj)
o(e). (10)
The sum of row i of the nominal liability matrix represents the total debt of
firm i and the sum of column j represents the total credit of firm j:
di =
n∑
j=1
Lij , cj =
n∑
i=1
Lij , (11)
where for the same firm i = j. Eqs. (11) provide the components of the system-
wide credit vector c and debt vector d. The difference between the credit and
debt for each firm gives the obligation network’s net position vector b:
b = c− d
bi = ci − di, di, ci, bi ∈ R, i ∈ N .
(12)
Definition 1. A vector b is called balanced if the sum of its components equals
0:
n∑
i=1
bi = 0. (13)
Theorem 2. Vector b representing the net positions of all firms is balanced.
Proof. Every obligation that forms the liability matrix contributes towards the
net position exactly twice, once as a credit and once as a debt. The sum of
all credits is therefore equal to the sum of all debts and the sum of all the net
positions equals zero:
n∑
j=1
cj =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Lij =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Lij =
n∑
i=1
di
n∑
i=1
bi =
n∑
i=1
(ci − di) =
n∑
i=1
ci −
n∑
i=1
di =
n∑
j=1
cj −
n∑
i=1
di = 0.
(14)
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
Corollary 3. As a consequence of vector b being balanced, the sum of its pos-
itive vector components must be equal to the sum of the absolute value of its
negative vector components: ∥∥b+∥∥ = ∥∥b−∥∥ , (15)
where b+ and b− are calculated as defined in Eqs. (1).
A balanced net positions vector is important for the analysis of cashflow from
external sources to the obligation network and vice versa. To visualize these
definitions we use a small obligation network, as shown in Fig. 1, that consists of
four nodes representing firms and arrows representing the individual obligations
between them. The arrow labels represent the values of the obligations.
Figure 1: Small obligation network
Eq. 16 shows the corresponding nominal liabilities matrix L. Note that L14
is the sum of the two obligations from Firm 1 to Firm 4. Eq. 16 also shows the
total credit and the total debt for each firm, as defined above.
L =

0 1 0 3
0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0
0 0 1 0

4
2
3
1
d1
d2
d3
d4
3 1 3 3
c1 c2 c3 c4
(16)
Vector b for this obligation network is calculated as
b = c− d = (3, 1, 3, 3)− (4, 2, 3, 1) = (−1,−1, 0, 2)
b+ = (0, 0, 0, 2) ⇒
∥∥b+∥∥ = 2
b− = (1, 1, 0, 0) ⇒
∥∥b−∥∥ = 2
n∑
i=1
bi =
∥∥b+∥∥− ∥∥b−∥∥ = 0.
(17)
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3 Clearing All the Obligations in the Network
Our goal is to clear all the obligations in the obligation network. As shown in
Fig. 2, to achieve this we introduce a special node v0 that can act as a liquidity
source for all the cashflow towards the obligation network as well as a liquidity
sink for all the cashflow from the obligation network.
In practice v0 can be a banking system where every firm in the network
has a bank account. It can also be a complementary currency system or any
other system with a store of value function. The cashflow is represented by an
external cashflow vector f ∈ Rn. When fi > 0 the cashflow for firm i is towards
the obligation network, while when fi < 0 its cashflow is from the network back
to its bank account. By adding the cashflow vector we have created the payment
system (L, f).
Figure 2: Payment system: obligation network, source/sink of financing v0,
and vectors representing cashflows
The cashflow available to firms from v0 changes their net positions. If vector
b represents the net positions of firms in the obligation network, let b∗ represent
the vector of firms’ net positions in the payment system. The value of b∗ is
b∗ = b + f . (18)
This simply states that the net position of every firm is increased by cashflow
coming into the obligation network or decreased by cashflow going out of the
obligation network. If our goal is to clear all the debt in the network, then –
assuming enough liquidity is available – after our intervention the net position
of every firm in the payment system has to be zero. In such a scenario, the
incoming cashflow is used to pay off the debts of all the firms with negative net
positions, whereas the outgoing cashflow carries the cash into the bank accounts
of the firms with positive (credit) net positions. Therefore,
b∗ = b + f = 0 ⇒ f = −b. (19)
Given an obligation network and the net positions b of its members, we now
define:
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Definition 4. The Net Internal Debt (NID) of the obligation network is the
amount of cash needed by firms to discharge all the obligations in the network:
NID =
∣∣∣∣b−∣∣∣∣ . (20)
The payment system in Fig. 2 relates to a real-life situation if we take that
v0 is a bank, complementary currency, or some other financial institution that
can provide an account-holding function and/or that can serve as a source of
liquidity. So the positive values of the cashflow vector f+ = (−b)+ represent
the payments from individual firms’ accounts at the financial institution, while
the negative values of the cashflow vector (or the values of f−) represent the
payments out of the network and into individual firms’ accounts. Since the
vector b of the firms’ net positions is balanced, the cashflow vector f is also
balanced. So the total cashflow flowing into the network equals the cashflow
out of the network: ∣∣∣∣f+∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣f−∣∣∣∣ . (21)
Definition 5. A payment system that can discharge all obligations in an obli-
gation network is balanced.
Theorem 6. Payment system (L, f) where f = −b is balanced.
Proof. A balanced payment system has to discharge all obligations in the obli-
gation network. That is, for every firm or node in the obligation network the
sum of all incoming and outgoing cashflows has to be 0. Therefore, the total
credit minus the total debt as defined in 11 plus the external financing has to
be 0:
ci − di + fi = bi + fi = bi − bi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (22)

Corollary 7. Every balanced payment system satisfies the flow conservation
constraint.
Proof. The flow conservation constraint requires all flows into a node to be equal
to all outflows from a node. For a balanced payment system this is true for all
nodes in the obligation network, as proven in Theorem 6. It is also true for the
special node v0 since the sum of all outgoing cashflow ‖f+‖ equals the sum of
all incoming cashflow ‖f−‖, as shown by Eq. (21). 
3.1 An Obligation Chain
To demonstrate the idea of a balanced cashflow vector that clears all obligations
in an obligation network, let us observe a small network with four firms that
contains only one chain, Fig 3. Firm 1 represented by v1 has an obligation to
pay 1 to company v2, and so forth. The three obligations imply the presence
of three edges: {e1, e2, e3}. It is easy to see from the graph of the obligation
7
Figure 3: A chain of obligations
network that, if Firm 1 has access to one unit of account of liquid assets, all the
firms in the chain can clear all their obligations, resulting in Firm 4 having one
unit of account more in their assets. Vector b for this obligation network is
b = (−1, 0, 0, 1)
b− = (1, 0, 0, 0)
NID =
∣∣∣∣b−∣∣∣∣ = 1. (23)
Therefore, the NID or the amount of external liquidity needed to clear all
obligations in this small obligation network containing only one chain is 1.
As shown in Fig. 4, to create a payment system we have to add a new node
v0 representing the liquidity source with two edges: e5 = (v0, v1) with value
o(v0,v1) = 1, that represents the flow of cash into the obligation network, and
e4 = (v4, v0) with value o(v4,v0) = 1, that represents the flow of cash out of
the obligation network. Therefore, clearing the obligation network leaves Firm
1 with 1 unit of account less in their bank account and Firm 4 with 1 unit of
account more.
Figure 4: A payment system with a chain of obligations
Fig. 4 also shows that providing liquidity is not just a problem concerning the
total amount of liquid assets available, or NID, but also of their distribution.
As shown in Eqs. 23, vector b− shows the distribution of liquid assets needed
to discharge all obligations in the obligation network. If we let the firms with
just enough liquid assets to discharge all obligations act as independent actors,
it will take three steps or three individual payments to discharge all obligations
in the chain. Using a centralized queue with an LSM, on the other hand, will
discharge all obligations simultaneously. This is an example of the time-saving
property of LSMs.
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3.2 An Obligations Cycle
Another interesting example of a small obligation network is a cycle, see Fig. 5.
Figure 5: A cycle
The NID for this network is 0. Therefore, all obligations in the cycle can
be cleared without the use of external liquidity. In this special case where the
vector b = 0, we can say that the network is balanced. That also means that
a cycle meets the flow conservation constraint at all nodes. In other words, for
each firm i,
n∑
j=1
Lji −
n∑
j=1
Lij = 0 ∀i ∈ N . (24)
This flow conservation constraint equation can be written as a special case of
the net positions calculation, Eq. 12. So the flow conservation constraint is met
when all credits equal all debts for every firm in the cycle.
Although there is no need for external liquidity sources, such a simple cycle
cannot be discharged if firms act as independent agents. Without the knowledge
of the existence of such a cycle, the payments to discharge the obligations cannot
be executed. To discharge all the obligations in a cycle without knowledge of
its existence, at least one of the firms in the cycle has to use external liquidity
to execute the first payment that then cascades around the cycle. Only with a
centralized queue and LSM can we discharge all obligations in a cycle without
the use of external liquidity sources. This is the liquidity-saving property of
LSMs.
Cycles in obligation networks are the key to liquidity-saving. At this point
it is worth noting that a cashflow that discharges obligations in the payment
system is always a cycle. This cycle can form inside the obligation network as
our example in Fig. 5, or it can pass trough the special node v0 as shown in Fig.
4. The flow conservation constraint is met in this case too.
3.3 Small obligation network with a Chain and a Cycle
Combining a chain and a cycle in a small obligation network we move closer to
a real-life situation. Fig. 6 shows the union of the chain and cycle discussed
above. The obligation network shown is obviously not balanced and needs
external sources of liquidity to discharge all the obligations. The solution is
9
Figure 6: An obligation network with a chain and a cycle
similar to the chain example. The vector b for this obligation network is
b = (−1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
n∑
i=1
bi = 0 =⇒ b is balanced
‖b‖ = 2 =⇒ obligation network is not balanced∥∥b−∥∥ = 1 =⇒ NID = 1
(25)
By definition vector b is always balanced, but the obligation network usually is
not. In our case NID = 1, so this obligation network needs an external liquidity
source that can provide 1 unit of account to discharge all the obligations.
The payment system containing chain and cycle is shown in Fig. 7. Although
there is enough liquidity in such a system to discharge all obligations, it cannot
be done if members of the system act as independent agents. The cycle in the
system prevents the smooth flow of cash. Firm 2 cannot discharge its obligations
even when it receives payment from Firm 1. This creates a gridlock that can
be resolved in several ways. One way is that Firm 2 borrows from an external
source. That implies the need for another edge from node v0 to node 2 with
value 1. The borrowed funds can be returned to v0 as soon as the payment from
Firm 5 to Firm 2 is executed.
Figure 7: Payment system with a chain and a cycle
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 8. Another way to resolve the gridlock is
for any other firm in the cycle to borrow from an external source, which would
10
require new edges from node v0. The third option, which still assumes that 1
unit arrives at v2 from v1, is that Firms 2 and 3 agree on the partial discharge
of the obligation between them. In this case, the partial payment of 1 unit
of account from Firm 2 enables Firm 3 to discharge one of its obligations. If
they decide to discharge the obligation to Firm 5, the cycle will be discharged
in full. This removes the gridlock situation created by the cycle. The flow of
1 unit from v0 trough the obligation network is therefore unobstructed and all
the remaining obligations can be cleared. If Firm 3 decides to discharge the
obligation towards Firm 4 before Firm 5 we are back to gridlock.
Figure 8: Example of gridlock resolution scenario. Sequence of steps de-
picted with dashed arrows is marked with letters from “a” to “e”
Only putting the whole obligation network in a queue with an LSM will
resolve the gridlock situation without the need for additional liquidity or special
agreements among the firms. The solution is to identify the cycles that discharge
the obligations simultaneously. Our example contains two cycles. The first,
smaller cycle involving firms (2, 3, 5, 2) is located inside the obligation network.
Obligations with value of 1 can be discharged and the cycle can be removed
from the obligation network without affecting the value of vector b. Therefore,
the NID or the minimal requirement for external liquidity to discharge all the
obligations in the obligation network remains the same. The situation in the
payment system after removal of this cycle is a chain with the liquidity source,
as shown in Fig. 4. This chain with a liquidity source forms the second cycle
that is discharged in full with the use of liquidity from the external source.
4 General Formulation
In the following sections we build on the basic definitions and examples of the
previous sections to develop some deeper results with important applications to
large-scale payment systems.
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4.1 A Cycle Is a Balanced Payment Subsystem
A cycle Ec = {ec1, ec2, . . . eck} in G is a closed sequence of k edges that connects
nodes Vc = {vc1, vc2 . . . vck, vc1} consecutively, where vc1 . . . vck are distinct.
Theorem 8. A cycle (Vc, Ec, p) where all weights of the edges are set to the
minimum obligation in the cycle p = min(o(e)|e ∈ Ec) is a balanced payment
subsystem.
Proof. The net position bi of every node in such a system is equal to zero since
all obligations are equal to p and every node has exactly one incoming and one
outgoing edge with the same value.
bi = p− p = 0 ∀i ∈ {1 . . . k}. (26)
Therefore, such a balanced payment subsystem meets the flow conservation
constraint of Eq. (24) and thus does not need external sources of liquidity to
clear all its obligations. 
Theorem 9. Subtracting a cycle from the obligation network does not change
the vector of net positions b.
Proof. All the flows in a cycle are equal to p. When a cycle is subtracted from
the obligation network both credit and debt positions of every firm included
in a cycle decrease by the same amount p, leaving the net position vector b
unchanged:
bi = ci − p− (di − p) = ci − di = bi ∀vi ∈ Vc. (27)

It is important to note that, while from the system’s viewpoint the removal of
a balanced payment subsystem does not change the need for external financing,
from the individual firm’s perspective it makes a big difference, since with the
removal of a balanced payment subsystem the corresponding gridlock situation is
cleared and there is no need for external financing to resolve it. This reduction of
the need for external financing can be observed as a reduction of the obligations
in the payment system.
4.2 Finding the Maximum-Weight Set of Cycles
The problem of cycle elimination from directed graphs to get an acyclic graph is
a well-studied area in graph theory. An overview of cycles in a graph is provided
by [5], and a fast parallel algorithm for finding the cycles in a graph is proposed
in [6]. Here we develop our own method, starting with the concept of “weight”.
Definition 10. We define the weight of an obligation network with set of edges
E as a function w : G → R whose value is the sum of all the obligations in the
network:
w(G) =
∑
e∈E
o(e). (28)
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Similarly, a cycle Gc of length k with all its obligations of value p has weight:
w(Gc) = pk. (29)
Removing a cycle Gc from the obligation network reduces its weight. The
weight of the residual obligation network Gr is:
w(Gr) = w(G)− w(Gc) (30)
Therefore, reducing the need for external financing by the individual firms can
be achieved by removing all the cycles from the obligation network, which is
also equivalent to resolving all the gridlocks. To achieve this we need to solve
the following problem.
Problem 11. Find a sequence of cycles Gci and residual obligation networks
Gri such that
q∑
i=1
w(Gci) is maximum, (31)
where
Gc1,Gr1 ⊂ G
Gc2,Gr2 ⊂ Gr1
...
Gcq,Grq ⊂ Gr(q−1)
(32)
and Gc1, . . . ,Gcq are cycles.
Sequential elimination of cycles from the obligation network will always lead
to a residual network Grq that is acyclic. The exact number of cycles that will
be eliminated is not known upfront and depends on the methods used to find
them. For example, every directed acyclic graph has a topological ordering, i.e.
an ordering of the vertices such that the starting end-point of each edge occurs
earlier in the ordering than the ending end-point of that edge. The ordering
can be found in linear time using Kahn’s algorithm for Topological Sorting [7].
This would be a possible formal test. Alternatively, the cycle-finding algorithm
usually has a “cycle not found” exit condition which is also an acyclic graph
test. The algorithm repeats until a cycle can be found. When no cycles can be
found any longer, whatever is left is acyclic.
Definition 12. Given an obligation network G, a maximum-weight set of cycles
{Gc1, . . . ,Gcq} is one of the solutions to Problem 11.3
It is known that there is always a way to eliminate all the cycles and that
the solution is not unique. The problem is that the removal of one cycle can
break other embedded cycles, so the solution depends on the order in which the
cycles are found. This makes finding the maximum-weight set of cycles even
harder. The solution is not to look for cycles at all but to use the concept of
balanced payment system and minimum-cost flow instead.
3There are many possible maximum-weight sets of cycles but only one maximum weight.
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4.3 The Minimum-Cost Flow Problem
The starting point of the method is a perfectly balanced payment system as
described in Sec. 3. We have an obligation network G with associated nominal
liabilities matrix L, net position vector b, and external cashflow vector f = −b,
forming a balanced payment system (L, f). We know that the cashflow through
this balanced payment system equals the NID as defined in Eq. (20). Now
we try to find a balanced payment system (M, f), where the nominal liabilities
minimum-cost maximum-flow matrix M represents the minimum-weight sub-
network Gm of the obligation network G. To find such nominal liabilities matrix
M we have to:
• Define a Grandsum function µ : Rn2 → R which is the sum of all the
elements of a given square n × n matrix. Looking for the minimum of
the function µ(M) is equivalent to looking for the minimum-weight sub-
network Gm.
• Make sure that that payment system (M, f) is balanced. Therefore the
column sum or credit vector minus the row sum or debt vector of matrix
M has to equal matrix L’s net positions vector b.
• Make sure we are not introducing edges between nodes in sub-network
Gm that do not exist in the obligation network G. Therefore, all matrix
elements Mij must have a value between 0 and Lij .
We can pose this as the following optimization problem:
Problem 13. Find the liability matrix M of the obligation network Gm such
that its Grandsum function µ is minimum:
min µ(M) = min
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Mij (33)
subject to the constraints:
n∑
j=1
Mij −
n∑
j=1
Mji = bi ∀i ∈ N (34)
0 ≤Mij ≤ Lij ∀i, j ∈ N . (35)
The reason we need to find M is that it is the solution to the standard
Minimum-Cost Flow (MCF) problem as defined in graph theory. The solution
to the MCF problem equals all flows in a cycle from the liquidity source v0,
represented by vector b−, through the obligation network back to the liquidity
source, represented by vector b+. We are looking for the shortest paths that
can carry the NID through the obligation network.
Consistently with standard graph theory, we define a new node s as a source
and connect it to nodes representing firms with negative net positions b−; and
we define node t, connecting it to nodes with positive net positions b+. The
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flow is set to the flow that clears all the obligations, i.e. NID or ‖b−‖. In the
standard MCF solution the cost of the flows through different edges can vary.
In our case the cost of the flow through different edges is the same, since we
do not want to prioritize any specific flow or firm. So using the standard MCF
solution all costs of a flow through an edge are set to 1.
Any minimum-cost flow algorithm will find a set of chains that can carry
the max-flow NID through the obligations at minimum cost. There are many
known algorithms to solve the minimum-cost flow problem, e.g. see [8] for an
overview. A polynomial-time algorithm was proposed by [9]. The solution is
not unique, but the value and the cost of the flow through the edges of the set
of minimum-cost flows are always the same.
Theorem 14. Subtracting the minimum-cost max-flow flow solution M from
the nominal liabilities matrix L leaves a balanced payment subsystem (T,0) that
requires no external liquidity source to clear the obligations:
T = L−M. (36)
Proof. This means that all the edges in the remaining nominal liabilities matrix
T are part of a cycle. The T must be balanced, so the vector b for the matrix
T must be 0.
n∑
j=1
Tij −
n∑
j=1
Tji = 0 ∀i ∈ N (37)
We can show that this is always true since L and M have the same vector b.
Tij = Lij −Mij
n∑
j=1
Tij −
n∑
j=1
Tji = 0 ∀i ∈ N
n∑
j=1
(Lij −Mij)−
n∑
j=1
(Lji −Mji) = 0 ∀i ∈ N
n∑
j=1
(Lij − Lji)−
n∑
j=1
(Mij −Mji) = 0 ∀i ∈ N
bi − bi = 0 ∀i ∈ N
(38)
This proves that the T is composed of cycles only. 
Corollary 15. T is a maximum-weight balanced payment subsystem.
Proof. Since we subtracted the minimum value of chains M from L, the remain-
ing obligation network T consists of the maximum value of cycles. Therefore,
we have a maximum-weight balanced payment subsystem T . 
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5 Using Balanced Payment Subsystems in the
Trade Credit Market
In normal business situations we seldom have enough cash available to clear all
our obligations. Therefore, we have to adjust our model to reflect the scarcity
of liquidity.
The trade credit market is an interesting example since there are no liquidity
sources at all. We can look at it as a payment system where the external
financing vector f equals 0. So we have a payment system (L,0) Still, it is
possible to discharge the obligations bilaterally or multilaterally by applying
the balanced payment subsystem idea.
Theorem 16. Subtracting a balanced payment subsystem from the payment
system does not change the net position vector b.
Proof. We will follow the similar path as in proof of theorem 9. We have a
nominal liabilities matrix L with a net positions vector b, credit vector c and
debt vector D. The balanced payment subsystem (T,0) satisfies the flow con-
servation constraint as shown in corollary 7. That means the cashflow into each
node of the balanced payment subsystem equals the outflow. We can define a
clearing vector p such that pi stands for the flow into or flow out of node i.
Now we subtract the balanced payment subsystem.
L− T = M (39)
and show that net positions vector of resulting nominal liabilities matrix M
equals the net position vector of nominal liabilities matrix L.
bi = (ci − pi)− (di − pi) = ci − di = bi ∀i ∈ N (40)

The method to discharge the maximum amount of obligations without using
any liquidity can be summarized in these steps:
1. Collect obligations to form an obligation network G.
2. Form a nominal liabilities matrix L and a payment system (L,0) without
external financing.
3. Find maximum-weight balanced payment subsystem T .
4. Discharge the obligations in a balanced payment subsystem (T,0) by send-
ing set-off notices to all pertaining firms.
5. Substract the balanced payment subsystem L− T = M .
6. Leave the remaining obligations in the nominal obligations matrix M to
discharge using normal bank payment system.
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The methodology and its use are described in [10]. It is marketed under
name Tetris Core Technologies (TETRIS) and has been used in Slovenia since
1991 in support of the trade credit market. We can call matrix T a TETRIS
solution. Depending on the economic conditions TETRIS discharges between
1% and 5% of GDP per year in saved liquidity towards the clearing of trade
credit obligations. This is an example of an LSM in the trade credit market
with a significant contribution to national financial stability.
6 Multiple Cashflow Sources
The cashflow vector f can be a sum of several different vectors. Fig. 9 shows
the payment system with structured sources of cashflow.
Figure 9: A payment system with firms accounts and an overdraft facility
The first source is the account holding balance for each firm in the obligation
network. This is the account holdings vector h+ describing the available cash-
flow from node vhin. The bank offers firms an overdraft facility. The maximum
available overdraft for each firm is described by the available credit line vector
a. The source of overdraft cashflow is node vain. The maximum exposure for
the overdraft facility amax ∈ R is set by the capacity of the edge connecting v0
with vain. Node vaout is set to define the overdraft facility repayments cashflow.
The repayments of credit limits vector r represents the current overdraft taken
by individual firms. This is the amount that has to be repaid to balance the
individual firm’s bank account. Node vhout is set to take the remaining cash-
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flow h− out of the obligation network back to accounts-holding node v0. Let
aA be the approved maximum overdraft for firms. Then a = aA − r. When
the distribution of the available external liquidity sources exceeds the values of
vector b− at all points, a balanced payment system can be formed. When those
conditions are met we can write:
b− ≤ h+ + a
‖a‖ ≤ amax
(41)
Therefore there are enough external liquidity sourced in firms account holdings
and overdraft facility to form an external financing vector f that satisfies the
condition for a balanced payment system (L, f)
f = −b (42)
If the conditions for a balanced payment system are not met, it makes sense
to find a balanced payment subsystem to facilitate the discharge of as many
obligations as possible.
7 Optimizing the Use of Available Liquidity
The optimal solution for a payment system described in Sec. 6 can be obtained
by applying the idea from Theorem 14 to the payment system in its entirety.
This ensures the maximum total obligation settlement amount with the available
liquidity sources. Leaving the execution of payments to the discretion of the
individual independent firms will yield a sub-optimal solution since firms do
not have sufficient information about the payment system. To use the idea
of removing the maximum weight of cycles from the payment system we have
to transform the payment system into an extended nominal liabilities matrix,
where liquidity sources become new nodes and the desired cashflows become the
new liabilities. So we have additional nodes v0, vhin, vhout, vain and vaout. Node
v0 is a debtor to nodes vhin and vain. This represents the total cashflow into the
obligation network. The amount for the edge (v0, vain) is set to the maximum
overdraft facility exposure amax. The amount for the edge (v0, vhin) is set to
maximum potential cashflow into obligation network ‖b−‖. Node v0 is also a
creditor to nodes vhout and vaout. This represents the total cashflow out of the
obligation network. The amount for the edge (vhout, v0) is set to the maximum
cashflow out of the network ‖b+‖. The amount for the edge (vaout, v0) is the
current overdraft facility exposure ‖r‖.
Node vhin represents all the available cash in the individual firms’ accounts.
For every firm i with a positive cash balance, there is a connection between nodes
vhin and vi. The amount for this connection is the cash balance available. This
setup ensures that the cashflow from the firms’ bank accounts will never exceed
the available cash in the individual accounts.
Similarly, we set up the available pre-approved bank account overdrafts. For
firm i with an overdraft approved there is a connection between nodes vain and
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vi. The amount for this connection is the amount of overdraft approved, a
A,
minus the overdraft already taken, r. The repayments of the overdraft facility
are set with the connection of nodes representing firms with overdraft taken to
the node vaout. The amounts for these connections are the individual firms’
overdrafts.
Let us denote such an extended nominal liability matrix by L∗. Let us apply
the MCF algorithm to find an extended minimum-cost flow M∗ and then the
extended maximum weight set of cycles T ∗ by using the equation
L∗ −M∗ = T ∗ (43)
Theorem 17. The extended maximum weight set of cycles T ∗ discharges the
maximum amount of obligations in the obligation network with the available
liquidity.
Proof. The extended nominal liability matrix has no external liquidity sources.
Therefore, new sources of liquidity are needed to discharge the obligations in
M∗. Therefore, the cycles in T ∗ used all available liquidity inside L∗ to discharge
the maximum amount of obligations in the obligation network. 
8 Conclusions
The generalization of the payment system presented allows for the implementa-
tion of an LSM outside the interbank payment systems. The potential in trade
credit markets is proven by 30 years of positive experience with trade credit
clearing in Slovenia. New developments in e-invoicing and tax compliance cre-
ate new opportunities to implement LSMs in the trade credit market.
There are new services developing that collect a huge amount of trade credit
information that can be utilized to implement the idea of the balanced payment
subsystem. New methods of information exchange using decentralized ledger
technologies (DLT) call for the implementation of LSMs that provide solutions
in environments where liquidity is not readily available.
Further opportunities for implementation are with complementary currencies
that can enhance the implementation of an LSM through the use of the available
mutual credit. It is also possible to design a payment system that discharges
obligations issued in fiat currency by using a complementary currency as a
source of liquidity. This way the benefits of mutual trust that are characteristic
of complementary currency communities are transmitted to the wider society.
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[8] Zoltán Király and P. Kovács. Efficient implementations of minimum-cost
flow algorithms. Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica, 4, 07 2012.
[9] James Orlin. A polynomial time primal network simplex algorithm for
minimum cost flows. Math. Prog., 78:109–129, 01 1996. doi: 10.1007/
BF02614365.
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